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SPINNING YOUR WHEELS OR WINNING THE RACE: KNOWLEDGE, 
RESOURCES AND ADVANTAGE IN THE FORMULA ONE INDUSTRY 
This inductive study takes advantage of a unique archival data base on Formula One racing. The 
accumulation of resources and knowledge are compared for three cases, representing the only 
instances of sustained competitive advantage. Enfolding data with existing theory leads to a 
model that integrates knowledge absorption and application processes. 








SPINNING YOUR WHEELS OR W INNING THE RACE: KNOWLE 
RESOURCES AND ADVANTAGE IN THE FORMULA ONE INDUS 
A  new theory of the firm , better still, a new theory of competitive advantage creation and 
maintenance would be of enormous value to the practice ofmanagement. ” (Schendel, 1996: 2) 
Schendel underlines that the creation and maintenance of competitive advantage is still 
very much the question of the day for both academics and practitioners of strategy. The 
emergence of the resource based view has lead many strategy scholars to shift emphasis away 
from  the notion that advantage is created by market structure and positioning, and to move 
toward an explanation which considers internal resources or assets as the source of the economic 
rents and competitive advantage (Wemerfeldt, 1984; Barney 1991). In addition to the role of 
industry structure in determ ining potential profitability (McGahan &  Porter, 1997), the resource- 
based view (RBV) has now become mainstream strategy thinking. 
The re-focusing of the field brought about by the RBV has spawned further theoretical 
development. In particular, the role of knowledge in strategy can be viewed as an ‘outgrowth’ of 
the resource based view (Grant, 1996). According to this perspective, knowledge is an intangible 
resource which is most likely to take the form  of an asset stock (intellectual capital) or resource 
flow (R&D investment). Alternatively, it can be argued that the role of knowledge in competitive 
advantage can never be fully understood through a resource based lens. Spender’s (1996) thesis 
is that the knowledge-based view of the firm  is a more general statement of the principles 
underlying competitive advantage. 
2 
The purpose of this paper is to move toward a theory of competitive advantage that 
integrates the knowledge- and resource-based views. This involves developing a set of measures 
that differentiates between the effects of resources and knowledge on competitive advantage. 
Then, using an inductive research design, we explore patterns in the relationships among these 
variables. Data comes from 33 years of archive on the Formula One industry and three specific 
case studies, representing the only instances of sustained competitive advantage in the industry’s 
history. 
The results of our analysis lead to several observations and conclusions. First, the data 
underscores the fact that the knowledge needed by a firm often grows outside it. Valuable new 
technologies, management expertise, and intellectual capital may become available in the 
industry, but firm-level advantage depends on knowing the potential value of such resources 
(appraisal) as well as on knowing how to apply them. At the “industry”’ or field-level of 
analysis, this means that competitive advantage moves between firms as individual actors and 
organisations react to shifts in industry factors (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993). Reactions to such 
shifts spring first from firm knowledge-absorption processes (research and appraisal) and second 
from firm knowledge-application processes (development and co-ordination). The role of 
individual firms in both creating and responding to such shifts is consistent with a 
I Although we use the term “industry” throughout the paper, this should not be taken as a reference to 
specific IO boundaries. Instead, we intend the word more as a place-holder for Spender’s less familiar (and for our 
tastes, too general) phrase (i.e. activity system). “Industry” has a more specific connotation that is more consistent 
with the traditions in the field of strategic management. In the present context, it is more useful to think of industry 
as a complex set of actors and events revolving around a particular competitive arena. In examining the Formula 
One “industry,” therefore we focus on relationships between rivals, buyers, suppliers, substitutes, and entrants, but 
we were aware of more specialised relationships that go beyond IO theory, such as between sponsor and racer, 
between constructor and advertiser, and between driver and managing director. Importantly, our analysis at the 




Schumpertarian view of the firm (Schumpeter, 1934), where entrepreneurs are constantly striving 
to bring in new ideas which move toward a state of disequilibrium. 
Our second and related conclusion is that existing resource-based perspectives on 
knowledge are focused too inwardly on the firm and knowledge application processes. This is 
typified by the centrality of application (Penrose, 1959; Spender, 1996), development (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992) and co-ordination (Grant, 1996) in the theory. While these processes are 
important, the Formula One data suggest a broader conceptualisation. In particular, knowledge 
absorption processes which are focused on researching (Cohen & Levinthal, 1992) and 
appraising industry factors (Barney, 1986) appear to be critical in the firm’s ability to develop 
new competencies and adapt to changes in the basis of competition. 
Third, the historical analysis shows that absorbing knowledge, applying knowledge to 
resources, and enjoying competitive advantage are asynchronous phenomena. Most of existing 
theory, however, appears to assume they are coincident. By separating knowledge-absorption and 
knowledge-application in time, the proposed model explains how firm-level learning process 
may counter the inertial and myopic forces described by existing theory. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Knowledge as an outgrowth of the resource based view 
The RBV perspective considers a firm’s resources as tangible or intangible assets which 
are tied to the firm on a semi-permanent basis. Examples of resources are brands, patents, cash, 
individual skills and knowledge (Grant, 1991). A number of different terms are used to represent 
the way in which resources are applied by the organisation, such as services (Penrose, 1959), 
- 
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capability (Grant, 1991) and competence (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Snow & Hrebiniak). The 
goal of the resource based view is to provide a basis for identifying those elements which create 
and maintain competitive advantage: these have been referred to as distinctive competencies 
(Andrews, 1971); intangible resources (Hall, 1992); core competencies (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994); strategic assets (Dierickx & Cool; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993); strategic capabilities 
(Stalk et al. 1992); core capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and dynamic capabilities (Teece & 
Pisano, 1994). For these aspects of the firm to create and sustain advantage they are required to 
meet a number of criteria, such as those set out by Barney (1991), that the competence is able to 
create value, is rare, is difficult to imitate and unlikely to be substituted. 
Knowledge is incorporated into the resource based view as an intangible asset, something 
which is held by particular individuals, for example: Maurice Saatchi’s knowledge of the 
advertising process; a salesperson’s knowledge of particular clients, a finance director’s 
knowledge of the money markets. This view assumes that knowledge is created only by 
individuals and that the role of the organisation is to co-ordinate and thereby apply the 
knowledge of individual members. In the case of McDonalds the key element is their ability to 
integrate the specialised knowledge of individual members in food preparation, human resource 
management, advertising, and the like. “Knowledge acquisition requires greater specialisation 
than is needed for its utilisation”, and firms exist, therefore, because production requires the “co- 
ordinated efforts of individual specialists” (Grant, 1996: 112). 
The focus of Grant’s theory is the concept of the firm as a device for co-ordinating the 
specialised knowledge of individual members. He traces the implications of this view for 
organisational structure and the boundaries of the firm. He does not change RBV tenets about 
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the source of economic rents, however. Knowledge itself is treated as a resource to be applied, 
but not created, within the firm. Thus, Grant’s is a knowledge-based theory of the firm, but it is 
resource-based theory of competitive advantage. 
The knowledge based view of competitive advantage 
The knowledge based view (KBV) draws from a distinct stream of literature. This 
includes work within the domain of organisational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Huber, 
1991), management of technology and innovation (von Hippel, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995), and managerial cognition (Weick, 1979; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Stubbart & 
Ramaprasad, 1988). This eclecticism reflects a need to understand the phenomena of knowledge 
and its contribution to the economic performance of the organisation. 
In his paper, which seeks to contrast knowledge based theory from the resource based and 
evolutionary views, Spender (1996) relates that, whilst the objective of these two perspectives is 
the same (to understand the nature of competitive advantage), the assumptions on which they are 
based are quite distinct. Some of the key contrasts are outlined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
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The major distinction between Spender’s perspective on knowledge and that afforded by 
the resource based view is that the resource based view starts from an atomistic level in terms of 
bundles of assets and skills. Knowledge is simply one of these resources, albeit an important 
one. In contrast, the knowledge based view starts with a more holistic perspective. Knowledge is 
part of an “activity system,” consisting of many elements and complex interactions, and it is the 
system which makes knowledge meaningful. For an organisation, “...to know is to be able to 
m 
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take part in the process that makes knowledge meaningful” (Spender, 1996: 59). Organisations, 
therefore, are knowledge creating entities, as are the larger systems in which they exist.. 
The assumption that organisations create new knowledge is inconsistent with a purely 
resource-based view of competitive advantage. Rather than advantage stemming from the 
ownership or control of knowledge-based factors of production (potential resources) (Miller & 
Shamsie, 1996), a knowledge-based theory suggests that advantage stems from the knowledge 
generated within the firm. The difference is important because it shifts the focus of research 
away from the characteristics of firm-level resources toward the organisational processes that 
impede or facilitate the creation of knowledge. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this research is to develop a more integrative approach to the role of 
resources and knowledge in a theory of competitive advantage. Although extremely deep in their 
own element, neither the resource- or the knowledge-based school has taken a thorough approach 
to incorporating the other. In this study we ask a few basic questions about the relationship 
between the two sets of ideas: 
Research question 1: Are the effects of knowledge and resources on competitive 
advantage independent, dependent or inter-dependent? 
To begin the task of integrating the two ideas, we first try to’disentangle them. Can the 
effects of knowledge and resources be accurately disentangled? Can reasonably valid indicators 
discriminate independent effects for them? Can the variables themselves be separated from their 













one from the other, then O&ham’s  law2 probably means challenging the knowledge-based v iew 
(i.e. Spender, 1996), which operates at a higher leve l of abstraction and introduces difficu lt 
constructs like “activity s y s tems. ” On the other hand, if measures cannot cons is tently  
disc r iminate between competitive advantage and its  sources (i.e. resources), then perhaps even 
the RBV is  redundant. The firs t challenge of our research design is , therefore, to conceptualize 
independent indicators of knowledge, resources and competitive advantage. 
Research question 2: Can knowledge-based explanations  of competitive advantage 
be subsumed under the RBV? (or v ice versa) 
It is  easy to “read into” traditional resource-based discuss ions  and see var iables  that are 
c lose ly  related to organizational knowledge, such as s k ills , competencies, and learning. 
Alternative ly , the knowledge-based discuss ion in Spender (1996) embraces many of the 
princ iples  of the RBV, literally  transforming resources into knowledge by identify ing them as 
part of a soc ially  constructed reality . Thus, question two is  the theoretica l vers ion of question 
one. Apart from whether the two ideas  are dis tinguishable empirica lly , there is  the conceptual 
issue of whether knowledge is  part of a resource-based explanation or resources part of a 
knowledge-based theory. 
Research question 3: W hat is  the appropriate conceptual (or causal) relationship 
between organizational knowledge and firm-specific resources as sources of 
competitive advantage? 
Rather than pitting the RBV and KBV agains t each other as alternative explanations , one 
might ask  whether they can be combined to produce a s impler, more cogent argument. This  is  
the essence of the third research question. It reiterates the purpose of this  research: to move 
2 All else equal, s impler explanations  are preferred over more complex  ones. 
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toward a theory of competitive advantage that integrates concepts from the resource and 
knowledge-based perspectives. 
In the next section, we explain the research design and outline the methods used to 
investigate the three research questions. This discussion begins with the reasons for choosing the 
Formula One racing industry as an appropriate research context. Then follows a detailed 
comparison of the attributes of knowledge and resources. This theoretical discussion provides 
the basis for defining qualitative and quantitative indicators of knowledge and resources and 
distinguishes these from competitive advantage itself. The paper then turns to an analysis of data 
from three case studies. Finally, the patterns that emerge from this analysis are incorporated with 
existing theory to develop an integrative model. The paper closes with a discussion of the 
implications of the model for future research. 
METHOD 
Research Design and Study Context 
There is a considerable amount of theory in the RBV, and research has begun recently to 
focus on theory testing (e.g. Miller & Shamsie, 1996). In contrast, however, the knowledge 
based view has received much less attention, and little or no empirical research has come forward 
(Grant & Spender, 1996). Further, the development of the two conceptualizations has proceeded 
relatively autonomously, and a purely deductive integration would risk merely accounting for 
one in terms of the other. In order to address the meta-theoretical questions just identified, 
therefore, our approach is to explore empirically the interplay between variables identified in the 
two theories, and on this basis, begin to conceptualize how they relate to one another. Thus, our 
9 
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design is grounded theory-building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Even though it takes advantage of 
existing theoretical knowledge wherever possible, the goal is to “let the data speak” with regard 
to relationships among variables. Put differently, this research uses an inductive logic 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
As Mintzberg (1979) observed, “. . . theory building seems to require rich description,” and 
accordingly, the study employs a multiple case study approach to collecting data (Yin, 198 1, 
1984). The first and most crucial step in such a design is the selection of cases. The principle 
criterion for choosing is the theoretical usefulness of the data for observing relevant phenomena. 
The cases should be sufficiently homogenous to constrain extraneous variation, but they must be 
diverse enough to reveal variation in the variables of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the present 
case, this “theoretical sampling” approach suggests the need for populations of knowledge- or 
technology-intensive firms, operating in fast-paced, competitive environments. 
The Formula One industry represents the pinnacle of automotive technology. The 
circuits used in the championship require cars that are both powerful and maneuverable, and the 
industry has been punctuated by several technical revolutions in engine and car design (See 
Figure 1). Industry observers estimate that a minimum investment of 25 to 30 million pounds 
Sterling is required to support research in the industry. The pace and competitiveness of the 
industry is represented by the fact that no team or driver has won the championship 
consecutively more than four times. In such settings, there is a greater likelihood for observing 
resource-based competition than in mature oligopolies, for example (Porter, 199 1). 
Perhaps the most vexing issue in designing research on competitive advantage, however, 
is defining the dependent variable (advantage) and differentiating it operationally from its 
antecedents and outcomes (economic performance). While one expects correlation between 
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these variables, there are many other factors that are related to performance, including industry 
and corporate effects (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991). Thus, financial indicators 
(either accounting or market-based) of performance alone cannot be equated with sustained 
competitive advantage or the resources underlying it. Valid indicators of resources must be 
industry-specific and should correspond to rent-generating performance at the firm-level of 
analysis. Thus, Miller and Shamsie’s (1996) study employed measures such as the number of 
Academy Awards received by Hollywood studies. Mehra (1996) used expert panel data to rate 
the profit potential of firm-level characteristics. 
The Formula One industry provides an excellent objective measure of competitive 
performance, i.e. winning races. Consistently winning races seems to equate well with 
producing an outcome which represents a demonstrable and quantifiable advantage. Thus, in 
this industry, sustainable periods of competitive advantage are objectively observable without 
relying on surrogates such as market share or financial performance. Economic rents in this case 
flow from sponsor and advertiser dollars and from dollar prizes channeled through the official 
industry association (Formula One Administration Ltd). The economic connection to winning is 
quite direct. Advertising rates, for example, are set according to which teams make the best 
billboard, and since cameras focus on those who lead the pack, winning races means higher rates. 
In particular, winners are declared each year both for “constructors” (race car construction 
companies) and drivers based on points accumulated over the season’s races. Plots of 
constructor point totals from 196 1- 1994 reveal distinct periods of industry dominance--sustained 
competitive advantage--for just three firms: Ferrari in the 197Os, McLaren in the 198Os, and 
Williams in the 1990s. Thus, we decided to analyze the history of Formula One racing over 33 










Formula One racing is also an industry that provides a particularly rich mix of 
technologies, assets and skills. These include automotive technologies, human capital (drivers), 
firm reputation and management expertise. Ron Dennis (CEO of McLaren International) 
characterized the basis of competition in Formula One as (1) finance (2) car design (3) engine (4) 
driver (5) organization. These comprise at least a partial list of critical resources or strategic 
industry factors (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993), and the data confirms their importance in team 
performance. Interestingly, no one firm has been able to dominate in all five of these 
dimensions. 
Measures of Knowledge and Resources 
As suggested in the first research question, one of the goals of this research is to sort out 
the resource- and knowledge-based elements of advantage. To achieve independent observation 
and measurement of such complex and potentially over-lapping variables requires careful 
definition of categories, even when the measurement is qualitative. Accordingly, Table 2 
attempts to distinguish knowledge and resources by comparing them along four attributes: 
tangibility, social, enduring and cumulative. These adjectives refer to characteristics which have 
been identified in the literature as important in explaining the link to competitive advantage. 
Since the two constructs share these attributes, or at least the “labels” attached to them, 
distinctions sharpen the focus of our observation. Based on these distinctions and other relevant 
literature, Table 3 provides operational definitions of the key variables in the present context, 
emphasizing their theoretical role in competitive advantage and illustrating them with examples 
from the Fl industry. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.] 
Data Sources and Analysis 
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Data for the study draws on an archival data base available for the Formula One (Fl) 
racing industry. The data is uniquely rich because Fl is the subject of constant media attention. 
This generates an enormous amount of written material detailing the actual words and actions of 
industry players--both individuals as well as firms--all of which has been collected in an industry 
archive located at the in the southern region of the United Kingdom.3 Moreover, the researcher’s 
own geographic proximity to this data base and to the physical facilities ofthe companies 
themselves allows for substantial industry contact. 
Published sources of data included periodicals (Autosport, Autocar, Motor Sport, 
Motoring News) which provided full race by race accounts of each season and detailed 
descriptions of the “behind the scenes” activity of each team. This data was supplemented by 
annual reviews such as the Autosport yearbook and other accounts including autobiographies of 
the key players to create a detailed chronological database. The more detailed accounts of 
sustained competitive advantage were sent to the three teams in question, these were then revised 
and amended following their input for factual accuracy. This process resulted in an industry note, 
short cases for a range of constructor firms, and longer cases for three firm~.~ The three longer 
cases (Ferrari, McLaren, Williams) are summarized briefly in Tables 4a-c, and Figure 1 depicts 
key events in the industry over the period. 
[Insert Figure 1 and Tables 4a-4c about here.] 
There are several ways that case studies can lead to the development of new theory. In 
the present case, we are interested in building an explanation of competitive advantage that 
integrates the knowledge- and resource-based views. This involves matching patterns in the data 
with theoretical explanations (Campbell, 1975; Yin, 1981). Studies involving multiple cases 
3 BP Library of Motoring at the National Motor Museum. (Beaulieu), United Kingdom. 
4 Cases are available from the first author. 
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have the advantage of permitting comparisons between, as well as within, cases in the search for 
patterns. Fundamentally, however, even a single historical case can be a fruitful source of 
explanation when it is accompanied by techniques such as theoretical sampling and enfolding 
appropriate literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Some of the best examples of theory development 
focus on one or a very few cases (e.g. Alison, 1971; Burgelman, 1983; 1991; 1994). 
RESULTS 
..- Firm-level analysis 
- 
- 
Figures 2a-c provide a graphical depiction of the relationship between racing performance 
(note the periods of sustained advantage) and data on the knowledge, property-based resources, 
and competencies available to each firm. This analysis suggests several patterns. 
First, the dominance of Ferrari during 1975 1977 resulted from their development and 
ownership of the 3 12T car, a tangible asset and property-based resource. But, to explain 
competitive advantage in terms of this single resource would be inaccurate. Indeed, the events 
leading up to the 3 12T car’s launch are marked by the accumulation of a number of unique 
property-based resources (sponsor funding, test track, driver). Ferrari’s reputation had frequently 
drawn in a quality set of resources before, but Enzo Ferrari’s “divide and conquer” management 
style usually prevented the firm from realizing their value. 
[Insert Figure 2a, 2b & 2c about here.] 
In 1973, however, management expertise became available in the form of a new team 
manager, Luca Montezemolo. Montezemolo’s professional approach led to more successful 
integration of resources, and in particular, it linked the organization’s technical knowledge with 
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the skills of Niki Lauda as a driver. This combination produced a car that was not only powerful, 
but that also handled extremely well. 
Ferrari’s subsequent advantage, therefore, was caused not by the control of a single 
resource. Instead, the advantage resulted from the dynamic interaction between property-based 
and knowledge-based resources within the firm. Technical competencies developed as 
individual skills and facilities were successfully coordinated by management. When integrated 
with the unique driver assets available to the firm, this produced a winning combination. 
Note that more evidence for the importance of coordinating resources and integrative 
knowledge is provided later in Ferrari’s history. The accumulation of important designer skills 
in 1980 and the development of V6 turbo technology in 198 1, while improving race 
performance, did not produce a sustained advantage in the 1980s. The departure of 
Montezemolo, in particular, and the death of Enzo Ferrari during this period left the organization 
without leadership, and therefore, without the ability to integrate technical competencies. 
Indeed, lack of management skill may be one reason that the tenure of World Champion driver 
Alain Prost at Ferrari was less than one year. 
PlA: Sustained competitive advantage results from a unique and valued combination of 
competencies (knowledge-based resources) and property-based resources. 
PlB: Unique and valued resources will not produce competitive advantage in the absence 
of the ability to integrate specialized competencies. 
It is notable that McLaren had been in existence just nine years and Williams only two at 
the starting point of Ferrari’s period of sustained advantage (1975). This difference in life span 









trend over a relatively long period of years. This trend suggests that both McLaren and Williams 
learned how to improve their ability to compete over time. 
More than just learning how to coordinate a particular set of resources better than their 
competitors, these firms appeared to “learn how to learn” and were able to continue improving 
race performance even after a shift occurred in industry factors and the viable bases of 
competitive advantage in the industry. For example, in response to the introduction of ground 
effect technology by Lotus in 1978, Ferrari did not modify its drive-train design in ways that 
were necessary to apply the technology. Instead, Ferrari’s commitment to build a better engine 
caused it to ignore and undervalue this technology. In contrast, both McLaren and Williams 
were already outsourcing engines and were thus in a position to absorb and incrementally 
improve on ground effect technology. 
P2: The role of knowledge in creating competitive advantage is governed by two process: 
a: The application of knowledge to the coordination and development of resources, 
and 
b: The absorption of new knowledge that is unrelated to the firm’s existing 
resources. 
Successful application but not absorption is evident in Ferrari’s pattern of winning. The 
Italian company’s advantage seems to have developed in the mid 1970s because skilled 
management resulted in better application of resources for a limited period of time. But, there is 
no long term, upward trend line evident in Ferrari’s race performance anywhere in its history.. 
Rather than learn the importance of managerial competence to team performance (absorb new 
knowledge), for example, Montezemolo was promoted and became less involved with the team 
in 1976. 
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Thus, had either McLaren or Williams accumulated more experience prior to 1975, 
Ferrari’s run of winning seasons might never have occurred. Indeed, the average point totals per 
race for McLaren and Williams during their winning years were 9.97 and 9.37, respectively, 
versus Ferrari’s 6.79 (all out of a possible 20 points maximum). In short, had all three firms 
competed at the same point in their life span, the “learners” would clearly have had the 
advantage. 
For McLaren, the pattern of improving race performance began at a low point in 1980 
and culminated in 1988- 199 1. In 1980, the company reorganized itself and appointed Messrs. 
Dennis and Barnard to key leadership posts. These individuals were valuable because of their 
ability to coordinate and integrate resources. As in the Ferrari case, this knowledge made it 
possible to assemble and manage unique, property-based resources, including the best drivers 
(Lauda, Senna and Prost), best chassis, and best engine available. Unlike Ferrari, however, 
McLaren’s pattern includes a learning trend. When the turbo engine was banned by industry 
officials in 1989, McLaren had already abandoned its turbo engine contract with Porsche and had 
negotiated virtually exclusive rights to the superior Honda engine. Importantly, Honda 
possessed capability in both turbo and normally aspirated engine development. By making the 
shift early, McLaren experienced the change in the basis of competition not as an industry jolt, 
but as the launching pad for a period of racing dominance. Thus, 
P3: Sustained competitive advantage is the result of a sustained learning process wherein 
firms develop the capacity to absorb new knowledge. 
The events leading up to Williams period of sustained advantage confirrn these assertions 
and also tell a different story. Like McLaren, Williams has been able in recent years to 







Williams is noted for the continuity of their team, as manifest in the long partnership between 
Frank Williams and Patrick Head. Despite Williams’ disability, he continues as the chief 
executive and sees his role as creating an organization environment in which the team can build 
the fastest and most reliable cars. The company is known for its consistent performance, and for 
its efforts to continuously improve the design relationships between the car’s chassis and its 
engine. In short, Will iams and Head are clearly the best “organization builders” in the industry, 
and their ability to create a culture of continuous learning has paid off. Will iams continues in 
1997 as one of the dominant Formula One contenders. 
Williams success illustrates the self-reinforcing, learning effects that resources and 
competencies have on one another. Competent management brings individual skills and 
facilities together to create a competence in car design. This competence leads to the creation of 
a new car. This newly available, property-based resource is then used to attract a first rate driver, 
which yields the fundamental competence of winning races. Winning races in turn brings more 
financial (property-based resources), and this leads to the further refinement of chassis/engine 
design. Figure 3 illustrates the self-reinforcing circle implicit in this argument. More formally, 
P4a) The availability of property-based resources encourages the development of 
competencies as the resources are applied successfully to the solution of organizational 
problems. 
P4b) The development of competencies leads to the availability of more complex property 
based resources, and hence, the development of higher order competencies. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
Like McLaren, the Williams graphs shows a pattern of learning prior to the period of 
sustained advantage (i.e. a discernible upward trend line in point totals from 1988 through 1993) 
and the ability to integrate unique property based resources (Renault partnership and drivers 
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Nigel Manse11 and Alain Prost). Again, the period is preceded by an event which makes 
management or coordinative knowledge available, in the form of an operating partnership 
between Frank Williams and Patrick Head and the increased involvement of Head in the overall 
management of the team due to Williams’ accident. The Williams advantage, then, is a 
consequence of having the ability to manage the resources controlled by the firm. Such 
knowledge includes not only the development, coordination, and application of knowledge 
within the firm, but also the knowledge related to the appraisal and absorption of knowledge 
from outside the firm (e.g. Renault and Honda engine partnerships, drivers, car designers). Thus, 
Williams appears to have the capacity for both the absorption and application of knowledge, and 
this may account for its recent high levels of race performance. 
P5: Firms that have the capacity both to absorb and apply knowledge will outperform 
firms who have only one of these capacities. 
Field-level analysis 
The relationship between knowledge, resources and competitive advantage becomes 
clearer when viewed from an industry- or field-level perspective. In particular, the shifts in the 
basis of competitive advantage are seen to result from exogenous mandates (i.e. regulatory 
changes), random events (e.g. Bruce McLaren’s death in 1970) or the responses of firms to a lack 
of some critical resource (e.g. Ferrari’s development of 3 12T responds to the dominance of the 
Ford DFV engine). Figure 4 traces a six year period (1973 to 1979), mapping the relationship 
between industry level factors and firm-level activity. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here.] 
Figure 4 shows a pattern of interaction between changes in industry-level knowledge (e.g. 
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(e.g. decision by Ferrari to design new engine, decision by Lotus to design new car), and firm- 
level development, application and coordination of such knowledge (e.g. Williams incremental, 
simpler and lighter interpretation of ground effect design). At the field-level, then, first-order 
learning comes in the form of incremental firm responses to developing, integrating and 
coordinating an existing set of critical resources. Second-order learning, on the other hand, 
comes in the form of firm responses to shifts in industry factors. 
P6a: Learning how to apply a given set of resources in the development of competencies 
(first-order learning) may be stimulated by activities within firm boundaries, depending on 
the availability of managerial knowledge about how resources and competencies may be 
developed and coordinated in the pursuit of competitive advantage. 
P6b: Learning what new resources and competencies are needed to achieve competitive 
advantage (second-order learning) may be stimulated by activities in the industry, 
depending on the availability of managerial knowledge about the technical relevance and 
market value of new resources and competencies in the pursuit of competitive advantage. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have, perhaps over-ambitiously, focused our study on developing the basis for a 
theory of competitive advantage, building on the resources and knowledge based perspectives. 
However, whilst we do not purport to have developed an overarching theory, we are able to 
propose how such a theory may evolve from these perspectives. These ideas can be traced back 
to the initial research questions. 
Research question 1: Are the effects of knowledge and resources on competitive 
advantage independent, dependent or inter-dependent? 
If the role of resource based and knowledge based theory is to develop a theory of 
competitive advantage then these case studies indicate how, independently, both these 
perspectives provide understanding and partial explanation of competitive advantage. However, 
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the cases emphasise the essential inter-dependence of the resources and knowledge perspectives 
when considering real-world phenomena. Every resource has a knowledge based component in 
some form, and every knowledge based element requires a resource in order to release the 
potency of the knowledge in pursuit of advantage. The data suggests that neither is sufficient in 
isolation as a basis for understanding competitive advantage. What is highlighted here is the need 
for a theory which accounts for the nature of resources and knowledge needed for competitive 
advantage, but in a way which both transcends firm level analysis and which is inherently 
dynamic and transformational. 
Research question 2: Can knowledge-based explanations of competitive advantage 
be subsumed under the RBV? (or vice versa) 
The discussion on the first research question suggests the appropriate basis on which we 
can respond to the second. To subsume the knowledge based view within RBV is to extinguish 
the very aspects (multiple and dynamic levels of analysis) that provide a richer insight into the 
nature of competitive advantage. It would be impossible, for example, to explain McLaren’s or 
Williams advantage without identifying industry- or field-level phenomena, i.e. the availability 
of ground effect technology and engine technology external to the firm. The capacity to absorb 
new knowledge appears crucial in understanding how changes in industry factors affect 
competitive advantage. 
To subsume the resource based view within a knowledge driven perspective presents 
different problems. Because the knowledge-based view incorporates the value of resources, the 
problem is not loss of conceptual richness. Rather, the problem with moving to a purely 
knowledge-based explanation of competitive advantage is that it may not be accurate. It is 
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possible to explain, for example, Ferrari’s period of advantage within the resource based view. 
Ferrari learned how to develop and co-ordinate a unique and valued set of competencies and 
resources. Lack of change in the factor markets mitigated the requirement for research about and 
appraisal of potentially new resources. Ferrari’s advantage relied very little on the firm’s ability 
to absorb new knowledge. For relatively stable factor markets, the resource-based view may, 
therefore, provide an accurate and more elegant explanation of competitive advantage. 
Research question 3: What is the appropriate conceptual (or causal) relationship 
between organizational knowledge and firm-specific resources as sources of 
competitive advantage? 
We have developed a number of ideas which may help in defining the characteristics of 
an integrated theory of competitive advantage. First, the knowledge and potential resources 
needed by the firm grow outside it. Firm level advantage is therefore created by the movement of 
knowledge and resources between the firm- and field- levels of analysis. Our theory must 
therefore centre on the dynamic interface between these two levels. This accords with Spender’s 
(1996) notion of an “activity system”. Here, firms interact with one another, with individuals, 
and with a complex, moving stream of events: “[Sltrategists are.. nodes of imaginative leadership 
and influence in the complex of heterogeneous emotionally and politically charged knowledge 
systems.” (60). 
Second, the dynamic nature of the interface between firm and field levels, highlights a 
major limitation of the resource based perspective. The assumption that competitive advantage is 
built on the deployment of existing resources is challenged by the case data. The case data 
suggests a far more fluid approach to continually appraising, absorbing, applying and co- 
- 
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ordinating resources which may often be highly mobile and imitable. Therefore to develop a 
theory of competitive advantage we must include, not just the application of existing resources 
and knowledge but also the appraisal and absorption of new knowledge and resources. 
These issues relate to Teece et al’s (1996) theory of dynamic capability which explains 
competitive advantage in terms that weave together the concepts of resources and knowledge. In 
particular, they argue that dynamic capability is a function of a firm’s position (existing resource 
configuration), path (unique history) and process (management and organisation). Process--the 
co-ordination and integration of activities by management--represents the knowledge or learning 
component of Teece et al’s (1996) theory. The outcomes of this process may be (1) learning to 
do more or less the same things quicker or better, or (2) learning to do new things 
(reconfiguring/transforming resources) (Nelson, 1991). The findings of this study suggest that 
dynamic capability extends beyond the application and co-ordination of resource bundles within 
an organisation to how the firm responds to changes in industry factors. This is where the 
concept of absorption (research and appraisal of resource bundles outside the organisation) 
provides a broader and richer perspective for understanding competitive advantage. 
Third, our findings suggest that competitive advantage may develop in a series of 
learning phases relating to the absorption and application of resources/competence. This phased 
characteristic can also be recognised in Penrose’s view of the dynamics of growth and in models 
such as that developed by Greiner (1982) which identifies the characteristics of particular 
learning phases. Our findings suggest, as with firm growth, that developing sustained 
competitive advantage is a dynamic process which can be explained in distinct phases: 
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application and absorption. Table 5 summarise the nature of the two phases, and Figure 5 shows 
how the phases operate in a cyclical manner. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 5 about here.] 
- 
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Application of a given set of resources leads to the development of competencies which 
leads to the co-ordination of the competencies in pursuit of competitive advantage. This self- 
reinforcing process is significant because it represents the firms learning process and because it 
is a “closed loop.” Thus, without the absorption of new knowledge into the firm, the cycle 
provides momentum for learning, but such learning is focused on how to apply a fixed set of 
resources to pursuing advantage. When changes in available factors occur, such a cycle can 
become produce myopia within the firm. Thus, left unchecked, first order learning causes firms 
to build an increasingly elaborate number of routines that serve to develop and co-ordinate a set 
of resources; these become a source of inertia which constrain the historical trajectory of the firm 
(represented by the large arrow in Figure 5). 
The absorption phase is important in changing the firm’s path. This requires the capacity 
to conduct research about and to appraise the potential value of industry factors within the firm. 
Ferrari was unable to get on a learning trajectory for lack of this capacity. McLaren and 
Williams seemed better able to absorb new knowledge, perhaps because of differences in their 
resource positions (i.e. no commitment to engine technology within the firm). For whatever 
reason, the ability to absorb new knowledge changed the trajectory of these firms, and these 
changes positioned them to achieve periods of sustained competitive advantage. 
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Recognising the distinction between the absorption and application of knowledge may 
provides a basis for resolving the one of “paradoxes” of organisation learning. Learning is 
required to adapt, but the process of learning creates inertial forces which impede adaptation 
(Huff, Huff & Thomas, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992). By separating absorption from application, 
the present theory shows that the inertial forces of the latter are overcome by the transformational 
forces embodied in the latter. This is not to suggest that second-order learning is disconnected 
from first-order learning. Rather, based on the data from the Formula One industry, it appears 
that the two phases occur within organisations at different points in time based partly on triggers 
for change that develop outside the firm. Thus, to adapt to changing factor conditions, the 
momentum and trajectory that results from the inertia of first-order learning must from time to 
time be corrected by the absorption of new knowledge. 
This study presents a number of issues which we hope will inform future research in the 
study of competitive advantage. First, research into competitive advantage needs to incorporate 
multiple levels of analysis in order to capture the firm/field interaction. Second, the dynamic 
nature of the phenomena requires research designs which are both longitudinal and able to 
identify the changing basis of competitive advantage within the industry. Third, we need develop 
methodologies which enable us to examine the idiosyncratic and fine-grained nature of property 
and knowledge based resources in this context. These are significant challenges. We hope 
meeting them will lead to the development of better theory and inform those who are in the 
practice of strategic management. 
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The organisation is.. 
Competitive advantage is 
achieved through.. . . 
Resources are.. . 
Competences are.. . 
Knowledge is.. . 
Resource Based View 
Unique bundles of resources 
energised through competences 
Possessing resources and 
competences which are unique, 
non-imitable and non-tradable 
Independent elements, the basic 
unit of analysis 
The means by which resources 
are activated. This includes the 
integration of individual 
knowledge as a intangible 
resource 
An objective, transferable 
resource. An intangible asset 
where individuals hold specific 
knowledge about specific 
activities 
Table 1 
Knowledge Based View 
A system of knowing created by 
an alliance of independent 
knowledge creating entities 
(individuals, teams or other 
organisations) 
A unique embedded deep 
knowledge coupled with the 
ability to generate and 
transform this knowledge 
Resources and competences are 
dynamic and interrelated. 
Individual knowledge merges 
into organizational routine and 
becomes systemic. 
Core competence is part of the 
systemic or deep knowledge of 
the system. 
It is embedded in the system 
and can be seen as an outcome 
of the system’s activity. It holds 
the system together. 
Contrasts between the Resource Based and Knowledge Based Views 
(after Spender, 1996). 
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Tangibi l i ty  
Soc ia l  
E n d u r i n g  
C u m u l a tive 
Resources  
Resources  m a y  b e  tang ib le  
o r  in tang ib le  ( intel lectual  
capital) .  Resource  
intangibi l i ty (asset  o r  ski l l  
based )  is assoc ia ted with 
in im itabi l i ty (Ba rney , 
1 9 9 1 ) . 
Cri t ical  resources  a re  o fte n  
bund les  o f asse ts a n d  ski l ls 
(Ba rney , 1 9 8 9 ; Diercryx &  
Coo l , 1 9 8 9 )  
A d v a n tage-sus ta in ing  
e ffec ts o f ren t -produc ing 
resources  der ives  from  
non-subs titu tabil i ty, non -  
t radeabi l i ty  a n d  
in im itabi l i ty (Canne r , 
1 9 9 1 ) . 
A ccumu la tio n  o f resources  
is a n  histor ical  a n d  p a th -  
d e p e n d e n t process.  Firm s 
learn  to  d o  s o m e  th ings  
wel l  as  a  resul t  o f a n  
id iosyncrat ic  exper ience  
base  (Diercryx &  Coo l , 
1 9 8 9 ; Ne lson , 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Tab le  2  
K n o w l e d g e  
K n o w l e d g e  is genera l l y  
in tang ib le  (excep tions  m a y  
b e  phys ica l  a r tifac ts as  
symbo ls  o f cul ture).  
K n o w l e d g e  m a y  b e  impl ic i t  
(tacit, unconsc ious)  o r  
expl ic i t  (dec larat ive)  
( K o g u t &  Zande r , 1 9 9 2 ; 
S p e n d e r , 1 9 9 6 )  
Ind iv idua ls  a re  “sources” 
o f know ledge  (Nonaka , 
1 9 9 4 ; S p e n d e r , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Cu l tu re , m e a n i n g , a n d  
structure rep resen t fo rms  o f 
sha red  know ledge  
( rou tines)  (Ne lson  &  
W inter, 1 9 8 2 )  
Ind iv idua l  a n d  o rgan iza tio n  
know ledge  endu res  in  th e  
fo r m  o f “m e m o r i e s , ”
inst i tut ional ized rou tines , 
symbo ls , e tc. ( Leonard -  
B a r to n , 1 9 9 2 )  
F i rs t -order  lea rn ing  
(capabi l i ty  d e v e l o p m e n t) 
occurs  in  th e  
transform a tio n  o f resources  
into dep loyab le  
c o m p e tencies/ski l ls / rout ine 
s; second-o rde r  lea rn ing  
(dynamic  capabi l i ty  
d e v e l o p m e n t) occurs  in  
ach iev ing  innova tive fo rms  
o f a d v a n ta g e  (new  
c o m p e tencies/ski l ls / rout ine 
s(Nelson,  1 9 9 1 ; Teece , e t 
al, 1 9 9 6 )  
Dist inct ions b e tween K n o w l e d g e  a n d  Resources  
. -  
11 -e . .  
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“Pure” knowledge (know-what): For our purposes, certain kinds of organizational knowledge can be divorced 
from context. This is accomplished by making the substance of what is known explicit and thereby removing its tie 
to a particular experience. Pure knowledge is distinct from competencies (or knowledge-based resources; see below) 
because the latter is tied to a specific task and set of resources. In Formula One racing, examples of pure knowledge 
can be observed in the “ground effect” design principle which was first codified by Lotus and later copied by 
Williams, among others. 
Property-based resources: These are the stocks of available factors which are controlled by firms as a result of 
property rights (ownership, contracts). Typically it is only the fortunate or insightful firms that are able to gain 
control over valuable property-based resources before the value is known generally (Miller & Shamsie, 1996: 521). 
Protection comes from trade restrictions, law, or first-mover pre-emption (Conner, 1991; Grant 1991). In this study, 
therefore, property-based resources relate to individuals and their knowledge and/or skill (designers, drivers), to 
facilities such as factories and testing tracks, to financial resources and to other factors such as logistical systems, 
brand names, etc. 
Competences (knowledge-based resources or know-how): Competencies represent the capacity to deploy 
property-based resources. They are “subtle and hard to understand.” In the language of knowledge theorists, they 
are “tacit.” They are protected from imitation because they involve talents that are elusive and whose connection to 
results is hard to discern (Miller & Shamsie, 1996: 522). Competencies may be technical, creative or collaborative 
and are always tied to a particular set of resources. For example, developing a car requires the ability to integrate the 
efforts of drivers, designers, telemetry systems, support teams, etc. 
Sources of advantage: Competitive advantage comes as a result of “pure” knowledge, property-based resources 
and/or competencies which are owned or controlled by the firm and which--separately or in combination--are 
difficult to imitate, scarce, immobile, and valued in the market. 
Table 3 
Operational Definitions of Knowledge, Resources and Competencies 
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Case History: Ferrari 1975 1977 
Constructor’s cup: Average: 6.79 points per race (theoretical max. 20) 
1975; 1976 & 1977 nearest rival achieved 74% of points score during same period (McLaren) 
Key Resources Technical Director: (Mauro Forghieri) supported by designers and technicians 
Technical Facilities: Factory at Maranello for development and production of 
all key car components (chassis, engine, suspension, gearbox); Test track close 
by at Fiorano, most sophisticated and up to date test track in the world, Ferrari 
were the only team to have their own dedicated test facility 
Finance: In 1969 Ferrari merged (in effect a takeover) with Fiat. This provided 
unrivalled financial supported in comparison with other teams who relied on 
their ability to attract commercial sponsorship. 
Driver: Niki Lauda recruited in 1974 was a good race driver, but also a highly 
competent development driver. 
Management: In 1974 Enzo Ferrari (then 74) brought in Luca de Montezemolo, 
a 25 year old Lawyer to run the team. 
Reputation: Ferrari have a charisma and reputation that does not exist in the 
British constructors, in particular drivers dream of driving for Ferrari, whether 
they are currently competitive or not. 
Competence Foremost competence was the design and development of race cars which, in 
Ferrari’s case, involved exhaustive testing and constant innovation 
Sources of 
Advantage 
The 312T car was instrumental in creating the advantage. It was notably 
different from the competition in that it had a flat 12 engine and transverse 
gearbox which made it extremely powerful, but more importantly it handled 
very well. Ferraris had always been fast, but seldon easy to drive or reliable - 
this constant development programme created a well balanced and very reliable 
race car. All the major competition were using outsourced Ford Cosworth VSs 
with Hewland gearboxes and were therefore unable to directly respond to the 
Ferrari advantage. Whilst Ferrari had always had a wealth of technical talent it 
was seldom able to get the best use from this resource due to the divide and 
rule approach taken by Enzo Ferrari. The management style of Montezemolo 
(who developed clear lines of responsibility and delegation)brought much 
needed clarity to the Ferrari team. He was able to link together Forghieri’s 
technical skills to Lauda’s understanding of the car. This combined with 
Lauda’s total commitment for development and the availability of the best test 
facilities in the world appears to have been the elements behind this period of 
sustained success. 
Reason for loss of Three factors appear to be contributory to the inability to sustain this 
advantage advantage. The first involved key individuals: Montezemolo was promoted and 
became less involved with the team, his role in creating a linkage between 
Lauda and Forghieri was lost. Second a near fatal accident in 1976 meant that 
Niki Lauda lost almost two months development time, this loss of momentum 
was never regained and Lauda left the team at the end of 1977. Third, a new 
technical innovation: ‘ground effect’, pioneered by Lotus, required engine 
gearbox configurations which were much narrower in order to work properly. 
This suited the ‘V’ configuration engines of the competition and left the Ferrari 
flat 12 at a clear disadvantage. 
Table 4b: Case Summary 
Case History: McLaren 1988- 1991 
Constructor’s cup: 






Reason for loss of 
advantage 
Average: 9.97 points per race (theoretical max. 20) 
nearest rival achieved 47% of points score during same period (Ferrari) 
Designer (John Barnard) and a design team which pioneered the use of carbon 
fibre to build a race car chassis. 
Drivers: Two world champions Alain Prost and Ayrton Senna 
Engines: Honda were committed to achieving success in Formula One and had 
put a huge amount of financial resources and people into this project. 
Finance: Sponsor Philip Morris (Marlboro) brought significant resources and 
stability to the team (flagship sponsor since 1974) 
Management: CEO Ron Dennis is credited with bringing professional 
management style and approaches to Fl. 
Race car design and development; Commercial opportunism and negotiation 
In this instance McLaren were able to bring the best of everything to bear at the 
right time. They had the best drivers, best chassis and best engine. Ron Dennis 
had been able to negotiate the exclusive use of the Honda engine after Honda 
decided to leave Williams in 1987. This arrangement was linked to the 
recruitment of driver Ayrton Senna who had worked with the Honda technical 
team whilst he was at Lotus. The linkage between Senna, Honda and the 
McLaren design team became crucial to developing an advantage. 
In the same way that it had all come together it all fell apart. John Barnard had 
actually left before the period of advantage, but many felt that his design ideas 
were well ahead of their time and therefore the results of his expertise remained 
with McLaren during this winning period. In 1992 Honda decided that they had 
achieved all their aims and would no longer participate in Fl . This seemed to 
catch Ron Dennis totally unprepared and without any viable alternatives to start 
working on over the important winter development period. This was 
subsequently followed by the departure of Ayrton Senna who had developed a 
strong relationship with Honda and no longer believed he had the best car at 
1 








x-. .  
x- 
Case History: Williams Grand Prix Engineering 1992- 1994 
Constructor’s cup: Average: 9.37 points per race (theoretical max. 20) 
1992, 1993 & 1994 nearest rival achieved 55 % of points score during same period (Benetton) 
Key Resources Technical Director (Patrick Head) the Williams team had been able to develop 
many good ideas into fast and reliable components of a race car. 
Management: CEO Frank Williams an experienced and entrepreneurial 
individual who saw his role as create the environment and resources for the 
team to build the fastest and most reliable cars. 
Engine: Supplied and supported by Renault 
Drivers: A collection of the both established and up and coming drivers, but 
period of tenure relatively short 
Finance: Provided by a number of sponsors: Rothmans, R. J. Reynolds & 
Canon 
Competence Design and Development of race cars 
Application of others’ innovations 
Overall automotive engineering competence 
Sources of 
Advantage 
Whilst the Renault engine plays an important part in the team’s success, much 
of the consistency of performance has been due to their careful, incremental 
development of the chassis to suit the characteristics of the engine. This success 
has also been attributed to the enduring relationship between Frank Williams 
and Patrick Head, this has brought enviable continuity to the team. They have 
also been able to attract some of the best new designers and engineers, although 
these individuals have often then taken up more senior positions in rival teams. 
Reason for loss of 
advantage 
Williams have not lost their advantage in the dramatic fashion achieved by 
McLaren or the slower decline of Ferrari. Williams are still near or at the top 
but without the clear advantage held earlier. The reasons for this loss of 
relative position is due to Renault making their engine available to the highly 
competitive Benetton team and also to the loss of a number of their younger 
designers to other top teams, most notably Ross Brawn to Benetton and more 
recently Ferrari. 
Core processes 
Dominant form of knowledge 
accumulated 
Dominant learning outcome 
Importance to competitive 
advantage 
Absorbtion of Knowledge Application of Knowledge 
Research about and appraisal of Coordination and development of 
resources (factors) outside the resources within the firm 
firm 
Explicit (know-what) Tacit (know-how) 
Second-order First-order 
More important when factor More important when factor 
conditions are unstable conditions are stable 
Table 5 
Knowledge Modes and Competitive Advantage 
Figure 1 
Strategic Industry Factors (1961-1994) 
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Merger with Fiat 
Designer John Barnard 
recruited to team I Ferrari open 
test track at Fiorano I Founder Enzo Fen-at-i dies \ 
Luca Montezemolo 
recruited as team manager; 
Mauro Forghieri rejoins team as 
technical director 
World Champion 
Alain Prost hired 
launched with 
Niki Lauda joins 
as driver I 
World Champion 
Alain Prost fired I 
Luca Montezemolo 
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in testing accident 
McLaren Intemationa 
formed, headed by 
Ron Dennis with Johr 
Barnard as technical 
director 
M23 car launched 
built from scratch to 
meet new fuel regulations 
(Marlboro) become 
use of Honda engines; 
Ayrton Senna & Alain Prost 
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Williams Grand Prix Engineering 
formed based on partnership 
between Frank Williams and 
Patrick Head. Significant sponsorship 
provided by Saudia Arabian Airlines 
tycoon Walter Wolf 
buys Williams’ team 
with FW acting as MD 
launches his first 
Frank Williams ’ 
is badly injured 
in an accident 1 which leaves him paralysed from the waist down 
I Switch from Ford to Honda turbo engines I 
?.enna killed 
it Imola I 
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are brought 
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financial resource of the design 
engineers 
and fabricators 
create a car 
Resource 
Figure 3 
The Reinforcing Cycle of Learning: Owning Resources and Competence Development 
1973 1975 1978 1979 
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Creation of Competences 
(knowledge based resources) 
off as an outcome 
of learning process 
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